

The Honorable Marsha J. Pechman

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE**

RYAN KARNOSKI, et al.,

*Plaintiffs,*

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, in his official capacity as  
President of the United States, et al.,

*Defendants.*

Case No. 2:17-cv-01297-MJP

**DECLARATION OF RAYMOND  
EDWIN MABUS, JR. IN SUPPORT OF  
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR  
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

NOTE ON MOTION CALENDAR:  
October 6, 2017

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

I, Raymond Edwin Mabus, Jr., declare as follows:

**Background and Experience**

1. I served as the United States Secretary of the Navy from May 19, 2009 to January 20, 2017.

2. Prior to serving as Secretary of the Navy, I earned a Bachelor's degree in English and Political Science from the University of Mississippi in 1969, a Master's Degree in political science from Johns Hopkins University in 1970, and a J.D. from Harvard Law School in 1976. Prior to attending law school, I served from 1970 until 1972 in the Navy aboard the cruiser USS Little Rock, achieving the rank of Lieutenant, junior grade. Following law school, I worked as a law clerk in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. From 1977 until 1978, I worked as legal counsel for the Cotton Subcommittee of the Agriculture Committee of the United States House of Representatives. From 1979 to 1980, I was an associate at the law firm of

1 Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver and Kampleman in Washington, D.C. and from 1980 to 1983, I was  
 2 Legal Counsel and Legislative Assistant to the Governor of Mississippi. From 1984 to 1988, I  
 3 served as Mississippi State Auditor (an elected position), and from 1988 to 1992 as Governor of  
 4 Mississippi. From 1994 to 1996 I served as the United States Ambassador to Saudi Arabia. From  
 5 1998 to 2000 I served as President of Frontline Global Services, a consulting company. From  
 6 2003-2007 I served as Chairman of Foamex, Incorporated, a public manufacturing company, and  
 7 from 2006 to 2007 as Foamex's Chief Executive Officer as well.

8 3. As Secretary of the Navy, I functioned as the chief executive of the Department of  
 9 the Navy, with the authority to conduct all of its affairs. As Secretary, I had comprehensive  
 10 oversight responsibility for (i) the Department of the Navy's annual budget, (ii) overseeing the  
 11 recruitment, organization, training, supplying, equipping, mobilizing, and demobilizing of Navy  
 12 personnel, and (iii) overseeing the construction, outfitting, and repair of naval equipment, ships,  
 13 and facilities. I was also responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies and  
 14 programs that are consistent with the national security policies and objectives established by the  
 15 President and the Secretary of Defense.

16 4. In connection with my personnel-related oversight responsibilities, I oversaw the  
 17 administration of recruitment, retention, and medical policies for active duty and reserve Navy  
 18 personnel. As Secretary, I performed these duties before, during, and after the end of the "Don't  
 19 Ask, Don't Tell" ban on gay service members serving openly in the military in 2011.

20 5. Also during this period, I oversaw the Navy and the Marine Corps through the  
 21 end of United States military operations in Iraq and the surge of tens of thousands of United  
 22 States troops in Afghanistan. I am keenly aware that the recruitment and retention of capable and  
 23 qualified service members is of critical importance to the readiness of the Navy and the Marines.

### 24 **The Navy**

25 6. The Department of the Navy comprises two uniformed Services of the United  
 26 States Armed Forces: the United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps. It is one of the  
 27 three military departments of the Department of Defense ("DoD"). The Navy, with an annual  
 28 budget of more than \$160 billion, maintains more than 270 deployable battle force ships,

operates more than 3,700 military aircraft, and employs nearly 900,000 active duty, reserve, and civilian employees.

7. The mission of the Navy is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas.

#### **Development of DoD Policy Relating to Service by Openly Transgender Persons**

8. On July 28, 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter ordered Brad Carson, Acting Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, to convene a working group to identify and address the practical issues related to transgender Americans serving openly in the Armed Forces, and to develop an implementation plan that addressed those issues with the goal of maximizing military readiness (the “Working Group”). A true and accurate copy of this order is attached hereto as Exhibit A. The Working Group was ordered to present its findings and recommendations to the Secretary of Defense within 180 days. In the interim, pursuant to the July 28, 2015 order, no service member could “be involuntarily separated or denied reenlistment or continuation of active or reserve service on the basis of their gender identity, without the personal approval of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness.”

9. As Secretary of the Navy, I was responsible for supervising the Department of the Navy’s participation in the Working Group. The Working Group met as a whole and also assigned various sub-groups to research and analyze discrete issues and report their findings. I met multiple times per week with my deputy to the Working Group, the Navy General Counsel, who would update me on the progress of the Working Group and the Navy’s positions on the issues discussed.

10. The Working Group was tasked with evaluating the hurdles, impediments, and concerns potentially raised by open service of transgender service members. They sought to identify all potential impacts on the Services and develop recommendations to address them.

11. The Working Group met and engaged in a detailed, deliberative, carefully run process. The goal was to ensure that the input of the Services would be fully considered before any changes in policy were made and that the Services were on board with those changes.

12. The Working Group conducted a comprehensive review of relevant evidence,

1 including: research and data; information obtained from medical, personnel, and readiness  
2 experts; and information obtained from discussions with transgender service members and  
3 commanders who supervised transgender service members. The Working Group also considered  
4 the experiences of civilian employers and insurance companies.

5 13. The Working Group also considered a study that the DoD commissioned from the  
6 RAND Corporation. That study examined all of the available research about the healthcare  
7 needs of transgender service members, the anticipated costs of providing healthcare coverage for  
8 transition-related treatments, and the potential readiness implications of allowing transgender  
9 service members to serve openly. A true and accurate copy of the report, entitled Assessing the  
10 Implications of Allowing Transgender Personnel to Serve Openly (“RAND Report”), is attached  
11 as Exhibit B.

12 14. The RAND Report concluded that the cost of caring for the medical needs of  
13 transgender personnel would be extremely small and that there was no evidence that allowing  
14 transgender people to serve openly would negatively impact unit cohesion, operational  
15 effectiveness, or readiness. The RAND Report also concluded that the Military Health Service  
16 could provide appropriate transition-related healthcare to transgender persons. The RAND  
17 Report also identified various DoD policies that would need to be changed to permit transgender  
18 service members to serve openly, including “transgender-specific DoD instructions that may  
19 contain unnecessarily restrictive conditions and reflect outdated terminology and assessment  
20 processes.”

21 15. Members of the Working Group discussed the full range of considerations  
22 relevant to assessing the potential impacts of permitting transgender service members to serve  
23 openly, including evidence relating to the costs of providing appropriate healthcare and evidence  
24 relating to the impact of service by transgender people on operational effectiveness and  
25 readiness. For example, the Working Group considered that while some transgender service  
26 members might be undeployable for short periods due to medical treatments, the overall loss of  
27 deployable time would not be significant and was consistent with the standard applied to other  
28 service members, who may take time off due to comparable medical treatments.

1           16.     The Working Group also noted that many private and public health insurance  
2 plans now cover transition-related care and that all civilian federal employees have access to a  
3 health insurance plan that provides comprehensive coverage for such care. This was helpful to  
4 ascertain both the costs of providing such care and utilization rates, as well as to demonstrate the  
5 need for the military to keep pace with contemporary medical science and practice in the  
6 provision of healthcare to our service members.

7           17.     The Working Group also consulted with representatives from the Armed Forces  
8 of other nations that permit openly transgender persons to serve. Those consultations confirmed  
9 that permitting such service is not disruptive to military readiness and has not led to significantly  
10 increased costs or posed any other significant problems. The RAND Report considered the  
11 experiences of other countries as well and found no evidence of any adverse impacts. Noting the  
12 most extensive research on how a policy of open service affects readiness and unit cohesion has  
13 been conducted in Canada, the RAND Report noted that “the researchers heard from  
14 commanders that the increased diversity improved readiness.”

15           18.     The Working Group considered that banning service by openly transgender  
16 people has numerous negative impacts, including requiring the discharge of highly trained and  
17 experienced service members, causing unexpected vacancies in operational units, and requiring  
18 the expensive and time-consuming recruitment and training of replacement personnel.

19           19.     The Working Group also recognized that despite a ban on transgender service  
20 members, transgender persons continued to serve in the military, but were forced to lie about and  
21 hide their identities, to the detriment both of those service members and of the military as a  
22 whole. As a result, the Working Group recognized that the primary impact of the policy was to  
23 cause harms similar to those caused by “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”

24           20.     During the period in which the Working Group was in operation, the proceedings  
25 of the Working Group were reported to and reviewed by upper level Department of Defense  
26 personnel at meetings attended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Chairman, the Vice Chairman,  
27 the Service Secretaries, the Secretary of Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense. At  
28 these meetings, the activities of the Working Group would be shared along with their preliminary

1 views. The meeting attendees would then discuss any comments they may have had on those  
2 views.

3 21. By the conclusion of its discussions and analysis, all members of the Working  
4 Group (including the senior uniformed military personnel) expressed their agreement that  
5 transgender people should be permitted to serve openly in the United States Armed Forces.

6 22. In or around April 2016, the Working Group communicated its view to the  
7 Secretary of Defense along with detailed recommendations regarding the full range of relevant  
8 policies and practical concerns, such as guidelines involving access to healthcare, housing and  
9 uniform standards, and when a transitioning service member should be authorized to conform to  
10 the standard of the gender to which they were transitioning.

11 23. On June 30, 2016, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter accepted the  
12 recommendations of the Working Group, and issued Directive-type Memorandum (DTM) 16-  
13 005, entitled “Military Service of Transgender Service Members” (“DTM 16-005”), a true and  
14 accurate copy of which is attached as Exhibit C.

### 15 **Change, Development, and Implementation of Navy Policy**

16 24. Following the Secretary of Defense’s announcement, the Navy’s implementation  
17 of the new policy was straightforward. We focused on the administrative tasks of promulgating  
18 and implementing the appropriate processes. Having presided over the Navy during the rollout  
19 of prior policy changes such as the repeal of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the complete  
20 integration of women into ground combat, I can confirm that the implementation of open service  
21 for transgender service members was relatively low-key, triggered fewer emotional responses,  
22 and was viewed as “no big deal.”

23 25. To implement DTM 16-005 as applied to the Navy, on November 4, 2016, I  
24 issued SECNAV Instruction 1000.11 concerning Service of Transgender Sailors and Marines  
25 (the “Instruction”). A true and accurate copy of the Instruction is attached hereto as Ex. D.

26 26. The policy and guidance in the Instruction, which was effective immediately for  
27 all Department of Navy (“DON”) personnel, established “policy for the accession and service of  
28 transgender Sailors and Marines, to include the process for transgender Service Members to

1 transition to transgender in-service.” The policies and procedures in the Instruction “are based on  
2 the premise that open service by transgender persons who are subject to the same medical, fitness  
3 for duty, physical fitness, uniform and grooming, deployability, and retention standards and  
4 procedures is consistent with military service and readiness.” The Instruction provides that  
5 “transgender individuals shall be allowed to serve openly in the DON,” and that any  
6 “discrimination based on gender identity is a form of sex discrimination.”

7 27. Pursuant to the Instruction, on November 7, 2016, Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice  
8 Admiral R. P. Burke, issued interim guidance in NAVADMIN 248/16 (the “Policy”) regarding  
9 “policy, regulations and procedures related to the service of transgender Navy personnel.” The  
10 Policy, which “applies to all Navy military personnel,” remains in effect “until superseded or  
11 cancelled.” A true and accurate copy of the Policy is attached hereto as Ex. E.

12 28. As with the Instruction, the Policy provides that “transgender individuals shall be  
13 allowed to serve openly in the Navy. The Policy was “premised on the conclusion that  
14 transgender persons are fully qualified and are subject to the same standards and procedures as  
15 other Service Members with regard to their medical fitness for duty, physical fitness, uniform  
16 and grooming standards, deployability, and retention.” The Policy thus declares that “[n]o  
17 otherwise qualified Service Member may be involuntarily separated, discharged, or denied  
18 reenlistment or continuation of service solely on the basis of gender identity or an expressed  
19 intent to transition gender.”

20 29. With respect to individuals serving in the Navy or Marine Corps, the Instruction  
21 and Policy state that transgender Sailors and Marines will be responsible to meet all standards for  
22 uniforms and grooming, body composition assessment, physical readiness testing, Military  
23 Personnel Drug Abuse Testing Program participation and other military standards according to  
24 their gender marker in DEERS, subject to the approval of an Exception to Policy (“ETP”)  
25 request.

26 30. To allow DON commanders to address medical needs in a manner consistent with  
27 military mission and readiness, the Policy sets forth detailed procedures concerning medical  
28 treatment for transgender service members with a diagnosis from a medical military provider



1 indicating that gender transition is medically necessary. Service members with such a diagnosis  
 2 must notify their commanding officer and request commanding officer approval for the timing of  
 3 medical treatment associated with gender transition. The commanding officer is the final  
 4 approval authority for a transition plan. Commanding officers must respond to a gender  
 5 transition request “within a framework that ensures readiness by minimizing impacts to the  
 6 mission (including deployment, operational, training, exercise schedules, and critical skills  
 7 availability), as well as the morale, welfare, and good order and discipline of the command.”  
 8 Furthermore, the Policy provides that timing of a medical treatment plan “should consider the  
 9 individual’s planned rotation date (PRD), deployment or other operational schedules, and  
 10 potential impact on major career milestones, whenever possible.”

11 31. The Policy further provides detailed instructions regarding an in-service  
 12 transition. The transition plan is considered complete once (1) a military medical provider  
 13 documents that the service member has completed the care outlined in a medical treatment plan;  
 14 (2) the service member obtains an appropriate document showing legal proof of gender change;  
 15 (3) the service member’s commanding officer provides written permission to change the gender  
 16 marker in the Navy Personnel Administrative Systems/DEERS; (4) the service member submits  
 17 for the gender marker change; and (5) the gender marker is changed in the Navy Personnel  
 18 Administrative Systems/DEERS.

19 32. As set forth in the Policy, in order to have a gender marker changed in the Navy  
 20 Personnel Administrative Systems/DEERS, the service member must submit the required  
 21 documentation showing legal proof of gender change and the commanding officer’s written  
 22 approval to Navy Personnel Command.

23 33. The Policy also provides that “[a]ll Service Members are world-wide assignable  
 24 as their medical fitness for duty permits.” “Any determination that a transgender Sailor or  
 25 Marine is non-deployable at any time will be consistent with established DON standards, as  
 26 applied to other Sailors and Marines whose deployability is similarly affected in comparable  
 27 circumstances unrelated to gender transition.”

28 34. Both the Instruction and Policy provide that effective July 1, 2017, the Navy and



1 Marine Corps will begin accessing transgender applicants who meet all standards.

2 35. In addition, the Policy included policy changes related to: (1) privacy in berthing  
3 and showering facilities as set forth in OPNAVINST 3120,32D, Standard Organization  
4 Regulations of the U.S. Navy; (2) drug testing and urinalysis as set forth in OPNAVINST  
5 5350.4D, Navy Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Program; and (3) physical  
6 fitness assessment standards as set forth in OPNAVINST 6110.1J, Physical Readiness Program.

7 36. On September 30, 2016, the Department of Defense issued Transgender Service  
8 in the Military, An Implementation Handbook (“DoD Handbook”). A true and accurate copy of  
9 the DoD Handbook is attached hereto at Exhibit F. The DoD Handbook is intended as a practical  
10 day-to-day guide to assist all service members in understanding the Department of Defense’s  
11 policy of allowing the open service of transgender service members. To that end, the DoD  
12 Handbook instructs all service members:

13 The cornerstone of DoD values is treating every Service member with dignity and  
14 respect. Anyone who wants to serve their country, upholds our values, and can meet our  
15 standards, should be given the opportunity to compete to do so. Being a transgender  
16 individual, in and of itself, does not affect a Service member’s ability to perform their  
17 job.

### 17 **The Impact of Reversing the Policy Permitting Service by Openly Transgender People**

18 37. Numerous military personnel disclosed their transgender status to the military in  
19 2016 and 2017 in reliance upon the Department of Defense’s statements that it would not  
20 discharge them on that basis, as articulated in DTM 16-005 and other documents. I did not  
21 receive any reports that such disclosures harmed the operational effectiveness of any Navy units.

22 38. On July 26, 2017, President Donald Trump issued a statement that transgender  
23 individuals will not be permitted to serve in any capacity in the Armed Forces due to “the  
24 tremendous medical costs and disruption that transgender in the military would entail.”

25 39. On August 25, 2017, President Trump issued a memorandum to the Secretary of  
26 Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security to reverse the policy adopted in June 2016 that  
27 permitted military service by openly transgender persons. That memorandum stated: “In my  
28 judgment, the previous Administration failed to identify a sufficient basis to conclude that

1 terminating the Departments' longstanding policy and practice would not hinder military  
2 effectiveness and lethality, disrupt unit cohesion, or tax military resources, and there remain  
3 meaningful concerns that further study is needed to ensure that continued implementation of last  
4 year's policy change would not have those negative effects."

5 40. President Trump's stated rationales for reversing the policy and banning military  
6 service by transgender people make no sense. They have no basis in fact and are refuted by the  
7 comprehensive analysis of relevant data and information that was carefully, thoroughly, and  
8 deliberately conducted by the Working Group.

9 41. As discussed above, the RAND Report concluded that any costs associated with  
10 providing appropriate healthcare to transgender service members would be "exceedingly small."  
11 In fact, the maximum financial impact estimated by the RAND Report is an amount so small it  
12 was considered to be "budget dust," hardly even a rounding error, by military leadership.

13 42. The claim that permitting transgender people to serve openly would be  
14 "disruptive" has no foundation. The same claim was used to oppose racial integration of the  
15 military in the 1940s, the increased recruiting of women in the 1970s, and the repeal of "Don't  
16 Ask Don't Tell." In each case, the prediction that disruption would ensue has not been borne out.  
17 Studies have shown that diversity actually improves unit cohesion. Units become closer when  
18 individual service members are respected for who they are.

19 43. Any evidence that permitting such service would be disruptive is entirely lacking.  
20 Since the policy permitting open service went into effect, transgender service members have  
21 been able to serve openly and have caused no disruption.

22 44. In addition to being contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence  
23 considered by the Working Group and the Secretary of Defense, a reversal of the DoD policy  
24 permitting open service and the banning of accessions by transgender people, in my assessment,  
25 based on my experience as Secretary of the Navy, disserves the public interest, for several  
26 reasons.

27 ///

1           45.     **Loss of Qualified Personnel.** First, banning transgender service members will  
 2 produce vacancies in the Services, creating an immediate negative impact on readiness. The  
 3 United States Armed Forces rely on an all-volunteer force, some portion of which are  
 4 transgender service members. The impact of the loss of those individuals, who serve at all levels  
 5 of service, is significant. Banning transgender service members will cause the loss of competent  
 6 and experienced individuals, who will be difficult to replace. The Navy has invested in their  
 7 education, and training. In addition to losing any return on that investment, taxpayers will bear  
 8 the cost of identifying, recruiting, and training replacement personnel. Our ability to replace  
 9 those individuals will also be hampered by the parallel reduction in the size of our potential  
 10 recruiting pool. Artificial exclusionary barriers like this weaken the military.

11           46.     **Unit Cohesion.** Second, banning transgender service members negatively impacts  
 12 unit cohesion, a fundamental component of readiness. The only relevant qualification for the job  
 13 of serving in the Armed Forces is whether an individual is capable of performing the job.  
 14 Diversity in the form of nationality, religion, race, who one loves, gender, or gender identity only  
 15 strengthens the force. Conversely, when the military asks people to lie about who they are in  
 16 order to enlist or remain in the military, it weakens the military and has a negative impact on unit  
 17 cohesion. Members of units know each other well and develop strong bonds. Unit members can  
 18 tell when other unit members are lying. A policy that forces unit members to be dishonest with  
 19 one another, including a ban on service by openly transgender people, weakens these bonds.

20           47.     **Erosion of Trust in Command.** Third, arbitrary decisionmaking erodes trust in  
 21 military leadership. I was dismayed by the abrupt reversal, because so much careful thought had  
 22 gone into development of the policy, with consensus at the highest levels of military leadership.  
 23 Furthermore, the initial directive to reverse policy through the Twitter medium was delivered  
 24 entirely outside the normal pathway of legitimate orders issued through the chain of command,  
 25 and the most recent memorandum of August 25, 2017 was also issued in a highly unusual  
 26 manner. It is also unprecedented to reverse policy in such an abrupt manner. I cannot recall  
 27 another instance in United States military history of such a stark and unfounded reversal of  
 28

1 policy, or of any example in our nation's history in which a minority group once permitted to  
2 serve has been excluded from the military after its members had been allowed to serve openly  
3 and honestly.

4 48. Even individuals who had reservations at the time the Working Group was  
5 announced trusted in the process and believed it was a fair and deliberative process that met the  
6 high standards of the military. This abrupt reversal leaves the impression among service  
7 members that military decision making is instead arbitrary and subject to political whims.

8 49. For transgender service members themselves, the reversal represents the ultimate  
9 mistreatment and breach of trust. In DTM-005 and in other documents issued by the Department  
10 of Defense, the military informed transgender service members that they could come forward to  
11 disclose their transgender status and serve openly, rather than facing discharge. Many  
12 transgender service members came forward based on those statements. They risked their jobs,  
13 housing, and progress towards retirement benefits in reliance on our word that we would treat  
14 their disclosures fairly and in good faith. Using that information now as a basis for separating  
15 these soldiers from their service is an unprecedented betrayal of the trust that is so essential to  
16 achieving the mission of all of the armed forces. The reversal penalizes transgender service  
17 members for doing what DoD encouraged them to do. Transgender service members, their chain  
18 of command, and their colleagues who may lose people on whom they rely, must now deal with  
19 this enormous distraction, thus detracting from military readiness.

20 50. This sudden reversal also undermines the morale and readiness of other groups  
21 who must now deal with the stress and uncertainty created by this dangerous precedent, which  
22 represents a stark departure from the foundational principle that military policy will be based on  
23 military, not political, considerations. In 2011, the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy prohibiting  
24 gay, lesbian, and bisexual people from openly serving in the military (Department of Defense  
25 Directive 1304.26) was repealed. More recently, DoD also removed remaining barriers for  
26 women serving in certain ground combat positions. The sudden reversal of the DoD's policy  
27 with respect to transgender service members sets a precedent suggesting that these policies may  
28


1 be abruptly reversed for baseless reasons as well.

2 51. This sudden reversal may also have a chilling effect on the confidence of other  
3 service members that they will continue to be able to serve. Religious and ethnic minorities who  
4 have seen an increase in discrimination under the current administration may fear that the  
5 military may seek to ban them next, creating a culture of fear that is anathema to the stability and  
6 certainty that makes for an effective military.

7 52. This sudden reversal undermines the confidence of all service members that  
8 important military policy decisions will be made under careful review and consistent with  
9 established process. Rational decisionmaking in the adoption of and change to policy impacts  
10 the military's ability to recruit and retain competent, high-performing people. The sudden  
11 reversal of policy makes recruitment and retention more difficult, as does the damage done to the  
12 military's image and reputation as promoting fairness and equality and of being open to all  
13 qualified Americans. That image and reputation are critical to the military's ability to attract  
14 talented and idealistic young people. Actions that tarnish that reputation cause real harm.

15  
16 I declare under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

17  
18 DATED: September 13, 2017

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Raymond Edwin Mabus, Jr.

**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America and the laws of the State of Washington that on September 14, 2017, I caused true and correct copies of the foregoing documents to be served by the method(s) listed below on the following interested parties:

**By Hand Delivery:**

US Attorney's Office  
700 Stewart St., Suite 5220  
Seattle, WA 98101-1271

**By Registered or Certified Mail:**

Attorney General of the United States  
U.S. Department of Justice  
950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, DC 20530-0001

Department of Defense  
1400 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1400

Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis  
1000 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20301-1000

President Donald J. Trump  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, DC 20500

I hereby certify under the penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on September 14, 2017 at Seattle, Washington.

s/Rachel Horvitz

Rachel Horvitz, *Paralegal*